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Abstract
Policy makers often decide to liberalize foreign bank entry but at the same time
restrict the mode of entry. We study how different entry modes affect the interest
rate for loans in a model in which domestic banks possess private information about
their incumbent clients but foreign banks have better screening skills. Our model
predicts that competition is stronger if market entry occurs through a greenfield
investment and therefore domestic banks’ interest rates are lower. We find empirical
support for our results for a sample of banks from ten Eastern European countries
for the period 1995-2003.
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Figure 1 
Composition of the population of firms 
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Table I 
Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics (1207 Observations) 
 
Sources: Own calculations based on Bankscope 2002 – October update, Bankscope 2005 – January update, bank and central banks’ annual reports. The 
number of banks, GDP growth and enterprise reform are based on EBRD Transition Reports; the real short term interest rate is taken from the IMF 
International Financial Statistics; the credit registry dummy is taken from Djankov et al. (2007). 
Note: For banks with negative equity, capital is computed as if the bank had 1 percent equity to assets in order to avoid misleading interpretation (as in 
Berger, 1995). 
Dependent Variable   Mean Min Max
Lending rate (%) Interest income on customer loans/Average loans. 16.15 0.14 49.59
  
Bank-specific Mode of Entry Variables      
Foreign MA (DMA) =1 if foreign acquired, 0 otherwise. 0.20 0 1
Foreign Greenfield (DG) =1 if foreign greenfield, 0 otherwise. 0.19 0 1
Foreign (already before 1995) =1 if foreign before 1995, 0 otherwise. 0.16 0 1
Foreign MA (already before 1995) =1 if foreign acquired before 1995, 0 otherwise. 0.02 0 1
Foreign Greenfield (already before 1995) =1 if foreign greenfield before 1995, 0 otherwise. 0.14 0 1
Foreign MA (since 1995 or after) =1 if foreign acquired in 1995 or after, 0 otherwise. 0.17 0 1
Foreign Greenfield (since 1995 or after) =1 if foreign greenfield in 1995 or after, 0 otherwise. 0.05 0 1
(Foreign MA)*(Age) 3.09 0 8
(Foreign MA)*(Age2) 13.03 0 64
(Foreign Greenfield)*(Age) 4.78 1 9
(Foreign Greenfield)*(Age2)
Age is the age of the bank since the acquisition or 
establishment. Age is only defined for within sample mode of 
entry (in 1995 or after). 
26.38 1 81
  
Country-specific Mode of Entry Variables      
Foreign bank share Market share of foreign banks’ loans. 35.81 0 99.39
Bank share of Foreign MA (MSMA) Market share of foreign acquired banks’ loans. 23.94 0 99.39
Bank share of Foreign Greenfield (MSG) Market share of foreign greenfield banks’ loans. 11.87 0 30.07
Foreign bank share (before 1995) Market share of banks that were already foreign before 1995. 7.68 0 27.43
Bank share of Foreign MA (before 1995) Market share of banks that were already acquired before 1995. 0.82 0 5.49
Bank share of Foreign Greenfield (before 
1995) 
Market share of banks that were already established before 
1995. 6.87 0 23.00
 
Foreign bank share (since 1995) Market share of banks that became foreign in or after 1995. 28.13 0 99.39
Bank share of Foreign MA (since 1995) Market share of banks that became acquired in or after 1995. 23.12 0 99.39
Bank share of Foreign Greenfield (since 1995) Market share of banks that became established in or after 1995. 5.00 0 26.92
  
Bank-specific Control Variables      
Liquidity (%) Liquid assets (cash, bank and central bank deposits)/Assets. 29.69 0.53 94.71
Deposit rate (%) Interest expenditures/Average assets 6.02 0 17.86
Log(loan loss reserves) Log(Loan loss reserves/Average gross loans) 1.51 -4.61 6.71
Capital (%) Equity/Assets 12.96 0 90.34
  
Country-specific Control Variables      
Log(banks per capita) Log(Number of banks per 1 million inhabitants) 3.56 1.79 4.42
Credit Registry =1 if public or private credit registry, 0 otherwise 0.47 0 1
Top 3 bank share (%) Market share of top 3 banks’ loans. 58.48 40.63 100
GDP growth (%) Real GDP growth. 4.06 -9.40 9.80
Real interest rate (%) Real short term interest rate. 4.10 -68.64 25.13
Enterprise reform =1 if EBRD enterprise reform index>=3, 0 otherwise. 0.47 0 1
     
          
Table II 
Pooled OLS Regressions of Bank Lending Rates 
 
Coefficient estimates are based on pooled OLS. Standard errors are robust and clustered on banks. All 
regressions include country and year dummies. The sample in (II) is restricted to foreign banks. Variable 
definitions are provided in Table I. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
  I II III IV V VI 
Foreign MA -0.14  
 [0.84]  
Foreign Greenfield -1.23* -1.39  
 [0.73] [1.01]  
Foreign (already before 1995) -1.42  -1.45 -1.5
 [0.92]  [0.93] [0.92]
Foreign MA (already before 1995) -0.76 
 [2.93] 
Foreign Greenfield (already before 1995) -1.52* 
 [0.89] 
Foreign MA (since 1995 or after) -0.09 -0.08 0.55 -1.03
 [0.83] [0.83] [1.15] [1.32]
(Foreign MA)*(Age)  -0.21 1.06
  [0.30] [0.66]
(Foreign MA)*(Age2)  -0.18**
  [0.08]
Foreign Greenfield (since 1995 or after) -0.69 -0.67 -2.98 -11.89***
 [1.13] [1.13] [1.95] [3.35]
(Foreign Greenfield)*(Age)  0.48 4.57***
  [0.35] [1.61]
(Foreign Greenfield)*(Age2)  -0.40**
  [0.16]
Foreign bank share in total bank loans -0.04* -0.02 -0.04* -0.04* -0.04* -0.04**
 [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
Liquidity 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15***
 [0.02] [0.04] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
Deposit rate 0.88*** 1.26*** 0.88*** 0.88*** 0.87*** 0.85***
 [0.14] [0.18] [0.14] [0.14] [0.14] [0.14]
Log(loan loss reserves) 0.57** 0.79** 0.57** 0.57** 0.57** 0.55**
 [0.24] [0.40] [0.25] [0.24] [0.25] [0.25]
Capital 0.06* 0.01 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.06*
 [0.03] [0.06] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
Log(banks per capita) -4.91** -6.41 -4.96** -4.96** -4.91** -5.06**
 [2.26] [4.11] [2.25] [2.25] [2.25] [2.27]
Credit Registry -1.45* 1.72 -1.47* -1.46* -1.45* -1.27
 [0.84] [1.18] [0.84] [0.84] [0.84] [0.85]
Top 3 bank share -0.18*** -0.09 -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.17***
 [0.05] [0.08] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
GDP growth -0.29** 0.07 -0.29** -0.29** -0.29** -0.30**
 [0.12] [0.14] [0.12] [0.12] [0.12] [0.12]
Real interest rate 0.14*** 0.07 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14***
 [0.04] [0.05] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]
Enterprise reform 2.00** 0.74 1.99** 1.99** 1.95** 1.99**
 [0.78] [1.19] [0.78] [0.78] [0.77] [0.78]
Constant 30.59*** 16.02 30.71*** 30.69*** 30.75*** 30.71***
 [7.98] [13.73] [7.96] [7.95] [8.03] [8.08]
Observations 1207 466 1207 1207 1207 1207
R-squared 0.52 0.67 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52
N banks 236 113 236 236 236 236
 
Table III 
Pooled OLS Regressions of Domestic Bank Lending Rates 
 
Coefficient estimates are based on pooled OLS. Standard errors are robust and clustered on banks. All 
regressions include country and year dummies. The sample is restricted to domestic banks. Variable 
definitions are provided in Table I. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
  I II III IV 
  
Foreign bank share in total bank loans -0.06**  
 [0.03]  
Bank share of Foreign MA -0.06*  
 [0.03]  
Bank share of Foreign Greenfield 0.17*  
 [0.09]  
Foreign bank share (before 1995) 0.39*** 
 [0.13] 
Bank share of Foreign MA (before 1995)  3.72***
  [0.91]
Bank share of Foreign Greenfield (before 1995)  0.22*
  [0.13]
Foreign bank share (since 1995) -0.07** 
 [0.03] 
Bank share of Foreign MA (since 1995)  -0.11***
  [0.03]
Bank share of Foreign Greenfield (since 1995)  -0.23*
  [0.14]
Liquidity 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.12***
 [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
Deposit rate 0.63*** 0.62*** 0.63*** 0.62***
 [0.19] [0.18] [0.18] [0.18]
Log(loan loss reserves) 0.4 0.41 0.34 0.34
 [0.30] [0.30] [0.30] [0.30]
Capital 0.07** 0.08** 0.07** 0.07**
 [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.03]
Log(banks per capita) -6.13** -5.46* -5.02* -5.88**
 [2.78] [2.87] [2.80] [2.77]
Credit Registry -1.99* -1.97* -1.63 -2.29**
 [1.13] [1.11] [1.13] [1.13]
Top 3 bank share -0.20*** -0.21*** -0.12* -0.07
 [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.07]
GDP growth -0.39** -0.40** -0.37** -0.31*
 [0.17] [0.16] [0.16] [0.16]
Real interest rate 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.13** 0.14***
 [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
Enterprise reform 2.06** 2.61*** 2.63*** 2.81***
 [0.97] [0.97] [0.98] [0.96]
Constant 49.58*** 46.19*** 37.79** 38.93***
 [15.20] [15.23] [15.12] [12.00]
Observations 741 741 741 741
R-squared 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.51
N banks 164 164 164 164
 
Table IV 
2SLS Regressions of Bank Lending Rates 
 
Coefficient estimates are based on 2SLS. Standard errors are robust and clustered on banks. All regressions 
include country and year dummies. The sample in (II) is restricted to foreign banks. Variable definitions are 
provided in Table I. Under the null of the validity of the overidentifying restrictions, Hansen’s J statistic is 
distributed as chi-squared (P-value reported). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
  I II III IV V VI 
Foreign MA 0.07  
 [0.83]  
Foreign Greenfield -1.20* -1.51  
 [0.71] [0.97]  
Foreign (already before 1995) -1.4  -1.43 -1.48
 [0.91]  [0.91] [0.90]
Foreign MA (already before 1995) -0.75 
 [2.89] 
Foreign Greenfield (already before 1995) -1.49* 
 [0.87] 
Foreign MA (since 1995 or after) 0.14 0.15 0.74 -0.94
 [0.82] [0.82] [1.14] [1.33]
(Foreign MA)*(Age)  -0.19 1.15*
  [0.30] [0.68]
(Foreign MA)*(Age2)  -0.19**
  [0.08]
Foreign Greenfield (since 1995 or after) -0.69 -0.67 -2.91 -11.93***
 [1.10] [1.10] [1.89] [3.45]
(Foreign Greenfield)*(Age)  0.46 4.61***
  [0.33] [1.58]
(Foreign Greenfield)*(Age2)  -0.41***
  [0.15]
Foreign bank share in total bank loans -0.06** -0.06* -0.06** -0.06** -0.06** -0.06**
 [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
Liquidity 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15***
 [0.02] [0.04] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
Deposit rate 0.92*** 1.24*** 0.92*** 0.91*** 0.91*** 0.89***
 [0.14] [0.18] [0.14] [0.14] [0.14] [0.14]
Log(loan loss reserves) 0.55** 0.79** 0.55** 0.55** 0.55** 0.52**
 [0.24] [0.40] [0.24] [0.24] [0.24] [0.24]
Capital 0.07** 0.01 0.07** 0.07** 0.07** 0.07**
 [0.03] [0.06] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
Log(banks per capita) -7.26*** -8.73* -7.34*** -7.34*** -7.26*** -7.45***
 [2.49] [4.57] [2.49] [2.49] [2.48] [2.50]
Credit Registry -0.68 2.14* -0.7 -0.69 -0.7 -0.5
 [0.80] [1.19] [0.80] [0.80] [0.80] [0.81]
Top 3 bank share -0.15*** -0.07 -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.14***
 [0.05] [0.07] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
GDP growth -0.13 0.15 -0.13 -0.12 -0.13 -0.14
 [0.11] [0.14] [0.11] [0.11] [0.11] [0.11]
Real interest rate 0.12*** 0.07 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12***
 [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]
Enterprise reform 2.33*** 1.15 2.33*** 2.33*** 2.28*** 2.32***
 [0.75] [1.09] [0.75] [0.75] [0.75] [0.75]
Constant 31.93*** 43.37** 38.88*** 38.88*** 38.75*** 39.68***
 [8.31] [22.03] [12.08] [12.09] [12.12] [12.23]
Observations 1170 465 1170 1170 1170 1170
R-squared 0.54 0.66 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54
N banks 235 113 235 235 235 235
J-statistic 17.24 7.07 16.92 17 17.41 16.6
P Value 0.01 0.22 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Table V 
2SLS Regressions for Domestic Bank Lending Rates 
 
Coefficient estimates are based on 2SLS. Standard errors are robust and clustered on banks. All 
regressions include country and year dummies. The sample is restricted to domestic banks. Variable 
definitions are provided in Table 1. Under the null of the validity of the overidentifying restrictions, 
Hansen’s J statistic is distributed as chi-squared in the number of overidentifying restrictions (P-value 
reported). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
  I II III IV 
  
Foreign bank share in total bank 
loans -0.09**  
 [0.04]  
Bank share of Foreign MA -0.09**  
 [0.04]  
Bank share of Foreign Greenfield -0.17  
 [0.15]  
Foreign bank share (before 1995) 0.27 
 [0.26] 
Bank share of Foreign MA (before 1995) 3.35
  [2.28]
Bank share of Foreign Greenfield (before 1995)  0.34
  [0.25]
Foreign bank share (since 1995) -0.10** 
 [0.04] 
Bank share of Foreign MA (since 1995) -0.17***
  [0.06]
Bank share of Foreign Greenfield (since 1995)  -0.55**
  [0.23]
Liquidity 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.12***
 [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
Deposit rate 0.69*** 0.70*** 0.69*** 0.69***
 [0.18] [0.18] [0.17] [0.17]
Log(loan loss reserves) 0.36 0.35 0.31 0.24
 [0.28] [0.28] [0.27] [0.27]
Capital 0.09** 0.09** 0.09** 0.08**
 [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.03]
Log(banks per capita) -8.82*** -9.16*** -8.05*** -9.37***
 [2.98] [3.11] [3.11] [3.11]
Credit Registry -1.41 -1.44 -0.92 -0.82
 [1.06] [1.05] [1.04] [1.05]
Top 3 bank share -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.1 0.05
 [0.06] [0.06] [0.07] [0.10]
GDP growth -0.18 -0.17 -0.18 -0.08
 [0.15] [0.16] [0.15] [0.15]
Real interest rate 0.12** 0.13** 0.11** 0.11**
 [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
Enterprise reform 2.62*** 2.45** 2.99*** 3.11***
 [0.95] [1.00] [1.04] [1.03]
Constant 57.79*** 59.46*** 48.95*** 45.93***
  [15.54] [16.30] [17.48] [16.32]
Observations 705 705 705 705
R-squared 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.53
N banks 163 163 163 163
J-statistic 8.49 8.37 6.13 2.95
P Value 0.2 0.14 0.29 0.4
Table A.1. 
First Stage Regressions for Bank Lending Rates (2SLS Results Table IV) 
 
We only report estimates of the excluded instruments. Coefficient estimates are based on pooled ordinary least squares regressions. Standard errors are 
robust and clustered on banks. All regressions include country and year dummies. The sample in (II) is restricted to foreign banks. Creditor Rights is an 
index aggregating creditor rights, taken from Djankov et al. (2007). The index ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor rights). We 
include 4 Factors of Economic Freedom. The factors related to: Trade Policy; Fiscal Burden of Government; Monetary Policy; Banking and Finance; 
Regulation. Each factor ranges from 1 (free) to 5 (repressed). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  I II III IV V VI 
Creditor Rights 0.81*** -0.37 0.80*** 0.80*** 0.80*** 0.79***
 [0.16] [0.32] [0.16] [0.16] [0.16] [0.16]
Number of Domestic Banks -0.32*** -0.76*** -0.32*** -0.32*** -0.31*** -0.31***
 [0.06] [0.14] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06]
Trade Policy -1.84*** 0.21 -1.86*** -1.86*** -1.87*** -1.91***
 [0.56] [1.29] [0.55] [0.55] [0.55] [0.54]
Fiscal Burden of Government -10.49*** -10.31*** -10.43*** -10.43*** -10.35*** -10.23***
 [0.55] [1.13] [0.55] [0.55] [0.55] [0.56]
Monetary Policy 9.12*** 10.80*** 9.13*** 9.13*** 9.09*** 9.11***
 [0.57] [0.74] [0.57] [0.57] [0.58] [0.58]
Banking and Finance -8.62*** -1.58 -8.61*** -8.61*** -8.85*** -8.82***
 [1.14] [2.31] [1.14] [1.14] [1.14] [1.14]
Regulation 12.72*** 12.66*** 12.70*** 12.70*** 12.73*** 12.64***
 [0.56] [1.71] [0.57] [0.57] [0.56] [0.57]
Observations 1170 465 1170 1170 1170 1170
R-squared 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
N banks 235 113 235 235 235 235
 
Table A.2. 
First Stage Regressions Results for Domestic Bank Lending Rates (2SLS Results in Table V) 
 
We only report estimates of the excluded instruments. Coefficient estimates are based on pooled ordinary least squares regressions. Standard errors are 
robust and clustered on banks. All regressions include country and year dummies. The sample is restricted to domestic banks. Creditor Rights is an 
index aggregating creditor rights, taken from Djankov et al. (2007). The index ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor rights). We 
include 4 Factors of Economic Freedom taken from Heritage Foundation. The factors related to: Trade Policy; Fiscal Burden of Government; Monetary 
Policy; Banking and Finance; Regulation. Each factor ranges from 1 (free) to 5 (repressed). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. 
Dependent Variable 
Foreign 
bank 
share in 
total 
bank 
loans 
Bank 
share of 
Foreign 
MA 
Bank 
share of 
Foreign 
Greenfiel
d 
Foreign 
bank 
share 
(before 
1995) 
Bank 
share of 
Foreign 
MA 
(before 
1995) 
Bank 
share of 
Foreign 
Greenfiel
d (before 
1995) 
Foreign 
bank 
share 
(since 
1995) 
Bank 
share of 
Foreign 
MA 
(since 
1995) 
Bank 
share of 
Foreign 
Greenfiel
d (since 
1995) 
  I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX 
Creditor Rights 0.51* 0.88*** -0.37*** 0.02 0.49* 0 0.02 0.88*** -0.39***
 [0.26] [0.29] [0.05] [0.03] [0.27] [0.00] [0.03] [0.29] [0.03]
Number of Domestic Banks -0.21*** -0.04 -0.17*** -0.16*** -0.05 0.01*** -0.18*** -0.05 0.01
 [0.06] [0.08] [0.04] [0.03] [0.07] [0.00] [0.03] [0.08] [0.01]
Trade Policy -3.05*** -3.23*** 0.18 0.97*** -4.02*** 0.03 0.94*** -3.26*** -0.75***
 [0.78] [0.93] [0.33] [0.27] [0.90] [0.02] [0.26] [0.94] [0.13]
Fiscal Burden of Government -10.77*** -11.95*** 1.18*** -0.81** -9.96*** -0.01 -0.80*** -11.94*** 1.98***
 [0.94] [1.01] [0.38] [0.32] [0.96] [0.05] [0.29] [1.00] [0.18]
Monetary Policy 8.31*** 7.97*** 0.34 0.52* 7.78*** 0.15*** 0.38 7.82*** -0.04
 [0.88] [1.05] [0.30] [0.29] [0.98] [0.05] [0.27] [1.05] [0.13]
Banking and Finance -12.87*** -13.38*** 0.51 0.89 -13.76*** -0.59*** 1.48** -12.79*** -0.97**
 [1.73] [1.51] [0.99] [0.84] [1.62] [0.13] [0.72] [1.53] [0.45]
Regulation 10.83*** 6.92*** 3.91*** 1.1 9.73*** 0.21*** 0.89 6.71*** 3.02***
 [1.36] [2.01] [0.92] [0.75] [1.92] [0.05] [0.72] [2.03] [0.30]
Observations 705 705 705 705 705 705 705 705 705
R-squared 0.91 0.83 0.91 0.91 0.89 0.93 0.90 0.83 0.96
N banks 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 163
 
